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NATURE OF BRIEF
This brief is a Reply Brief conforming to the requirements of Utah R.App.l' .'4ft j
This Rule requires dial this hc\)i\ huri urnum) OMP, A I.I"K' of contents, a tabic of
• Hilhonlies, an argument, and a short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
REPLY TO PRELIMINARY M A T T E R S
Appeliitii' I ii i Aiiniw) lisialrs Homeowners Association (hereafter "Homeowners")
feels the need to biiefly reply to preliminary matters raised in Appellee Foothi
Company^ (hereaftt

r

• • • • • * aers, in its initial brief in this

matter, stated in paragraph 4 on page 3 that". . . The only parties against whom title was
not quieted in this case were Foothills and Gerald 11 IUgley ami Bdglr v & I 'ompany." The
i

- ••*' itled "Statement of the Case," alleges that "Any order quieting

:..IL in this action wJbich purports iu extinguish interests under the \vc)) J r ^ "

jgjttvmmt

cannot bind individual utnttbt'is ni llic I)»111Mt' Lmuly who were persons with a known
interest in the well lease agreement, but were not named or served in this action." (Foothills
Bi p. 2).

.'

..-

, . ,

recited in the Statement of Facts in Homeowners' opening brief:
All unknown persons claiming an interest in Hi-Country Estates
Subdivision were served pursuant to an Order authorizing
service of summons by publication entered on March 23, 1987,
by the Honorable David B. Dee (R 312, 313). Proof of
publication was presented to the Court on or about May 1,1987
(R. 340). Therefore, the only parties against whom title was
not quieted in this case were Foothills and Gerald H. Barley
and Bagley & Company.
Homeowners' opening brief p 3,

1

Since the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals ruling that Gerald H. Bagley and Bagley
& Company had no interest in the water system in question, and were not entitled to
damages of any kind as a result of their association with the water system, and since Gerald
H. Bagley and Bagley & Company failed to petition the Utah Supreme Court for certiorari,
their interests have been extinguished as well. See U,CA. § 78-40-12 (1953). Foothills
Water Company was the successor in interest to Bagley & Company and Gerald H. Bagley
with regard to the 1977 Well Lease Agreement (R. 576-577, 647). In his Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law dated October 31, 1990, the trial judge found that Defendants
Gerald PL Bagley and Bagley & Company had transferred all claims, rights, title and interest
in the water system and water right to Defendant to J. Rodney Dansie by agreement of
October 31, 1985, and that all such claims, rights, title, and interest in said water system and
water right merged with those of Defendant J. Rodney Dansie and Defendant Foothills
Water Company as of that date. See Add. 5 at p. 4 C. of L. of Appellant's first round
opening Brief in this matter (as opposed to this second round of briefing on remand from
the Supreme Court).
Furthermore, at the time Homeowners filed their lawsuit on March 8, 1985, and
subsequently, Homeowners were unaware, and remain unaware to this day, of what persons
or entities might be claiming to be the successor of Jesse H. Dansie, with regard to the Well
Lease and Water Line Extension Agreement. Homeowners had every reason to believe that
J. Rodney Dansie was the successor to his father Jesse H. Dansie's interest in the Well
Lease and Water Line Extension Agreement, and this Court upheld the trial judge's initial
decision to quiet title to the water system and water right in Homeowners as against all
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parties to the action. It is significant that Defendant J. Rodney Dansie did not appeal from
any of the Court's Orders in this case (R. 1947-48). That being the case, and J. Rodney
Dansie having been personally sued in this action, the interest of J. Rodney Dansie has thus
been extinguished by the Quiet Title Order issued by Judge Brian after remand from the
Court of Appeals on February 11,1994. This understanding of J. Rodney Dansie's interest
in succeeding his father Jesse H. Dansie with regard to the 1977 Well Lease Agreement is
supported by the Responsive brief filed in this instant appeal by Appellee Foothills Water
Company. In a footnote on page 15 of its responsive brief, Foothills states "In April of
1987, Foothills and Dansie agreed to continue the Well Lease on a month-to-month basis,
and continued that arrangement until March of 1993." Although much more will be said
about this particular statement infra in this brief, Jesse H. Dansie, the original party to the
Well Lease Agreement, died on March 8, 1987 {see Addendum 1), and, therefore, the only
other Dansie involved in this lawsuit is J. Rodney Dansie and must be the "Dansie" that is
referred to in Foothills' initial brief in the instant matter.
Furthermore, due to the fact that Homeowners was having trouble determining who
may claim an interest in the water system, Homeowners chose to sue "unknown persons
claiming an interest in Hi-Country Estates Subdivision." These unknown persons were
served pursuant to an Order Authorizing Service of Summons by Publication entered on
March 23, 1987, by the Honorable David B. Dee (R. 313, 313). Proof of Publication was
presented to the Court on or about May 1, 1987 (R. 340). Thus, the Court's Quiet Title
Order in favor of Homeowners extinguished the claims of any and all persons not directly
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involved in the lawsuit who had an opportunity to present their interest in this lawsuit, but
failed to do so. See U.CA. § 78-40-12 (1953) and U.R.C.P. 4.
Therefore, it is indeed true that the only party to whom title has not been quieted
in this case is Foothills Water Company.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SUPREME COURT OPINION ALLOWS THIS COURT
TO REVERSE THE TRIAL JUDGE'S DETERMINATION AS
TO THE VALUE OF THE WATER SYSTEM ON GROUNDS
OTHER THAN THOSE FOUND IMPERMISSIBLE BY THE
UTAH SUPREME COURT.
Foothills argues in its responsive brief that the Utah Supreme Court's opinion
compels affirmance of the district court's ruling. However, Foothills is incorrect when it
alleges that the Supreme Court's opinion "compels affirmance of the district court's ruling."
In its opinion (found at Add. 3 to Homeowners' opening brief), the Utah Supreme Court
simply ruled ". . . The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the district court's denial of the
Homeowners Association's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of the amount of
reimbursement owed to the water company and in ordering the district court to defer to the
PSC" 901 P.2d 1017 at 1022. The Court went lo great lengths to point out that the Public
Service Commission did not have the power and authority to determine fair market value
of the water system for all purposes, but only for rate-making purposes. Id.
Thus, a reading of the Supreme Court's opinion clearly shows that that Court did not
consider the additional issues raised by Homeowners before this Court in the initial first
round appeal. Those additional issues were: Homeowners should not have been required
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to pay for the water right; Homeowners have already paid for the water system and should
not be required to pay a second time; and the water system in this case has little value to
anyone but Appellant, but at any rate is worth no more than $27,650.00.
In fact, the Utah Supreme Court's Order granting certiorari specifically stated 'The
Petition for Writ of Certiorari is granted only as to the jurisdiction of the Public Service
Commission." (See Add. 2 to Appellant's opening brief). The only conclusion that can be
reached is that the Supreme Court's ruling stands for the proposition that this Court cannot
base a reversal of the trial court's decision to order Homeowners to pay $98,500.00 for the
water right and water system upon any decision made by the Public Service Commission.
Therefore, the statement of Foothills in its responsive brief in the instant matter that "The
Utah Supreme Court rejected the arguments advanced by Homeowners for reversal of the
issues remaining in this case and remanded the case to this Court to complete the appeals
process" is false and misleading. The only argument advanced by Homeowners which was
considered by the Utah Supreme Court was the argument relating to the Public Service
Commission. It is the province of this Court to determine whether or not the decision of
the trial judge should be reversed on other grounds presented to this Court in the initial
appeal, but not presented to the Supreme Court due to the restrictions created in the grant
of certiorari.
Finally on this point, Homeowners would have this Court note that the Utah
Supreme Court has the power to remand any case it reviews on certiorari directly back to
the trial court for judgment or proceedings consistent with its opinion. See, e.g. Crookston
v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991); U.R.C.P. 30. The fact that the Utah
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Supreme Court chose to remand this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals is clearly a basis
for concluding that it was the intent of the Court to have the Court of Appeals entertain
further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Such further proceedings would include a
determination by this Court that the prior basis it used for reversing the trial judge's
decision to require Homeowners to pay $98,500.00 for the water right and water system was
erroneous; but would also include this Court's further review of other bases originally
presented by Homeowners in its first appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals for reversing the
trial judge's determination.
The reasoning presented above also applies to the issue of whether or not this Court
has the right to determine that the Well Lease was a valid and binding encumbrance on the
water system. Foothills states in its responsive brief that ". . . The Utah Supreme Court
pointed out that the district court ruled that the Well Lease was a valid and binding
encumbrance on the water system not withstanding the PSC's order." Homeowners would
say "so what?".

The Supreme Court was merely stating the district court's ruling.

Fortunately, Foothills is honest enough to admit that the Utah Supreme Court "did not
expressly mandate affirmance of the district court's ruling." However, Foothills goes on to
claim that the Supreme Court's decision invalidates Homeowners' additional arguments for
reversal and compels affirmance of the trial judge's decision. Such a statement by Foothills
is a non sequitur. As stated above, the only thing the Supreme Court did was remand the
case to this Court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Therefore, as with the
valuation issue, this Court is compelled only to conclude that the Public Service Commission's determinations regarding the Well Lease Agreement cannot be a basis for invalidating
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the Agreement. It clearly leaves open, however, the issue of whether or not this Court
should reverse the trial judge on other grounds raised by Homeowners in their original
appeal to this Court. Homeowners ask this Court to reject the conclusion that this Court
has no power to do anything but affirm the district court's ruling based upon the Supreme
Court's opinion.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURTS DETERMINATION REGARDING
FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE WATER SYSTEM AND
WATER RIGHT IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
In its responsive brief, Foothills argues that Homeowners have failed to show that
the decision of the district court in setting the amount of value for the water system and
water right at $98,500.00 is clearly erroneous. Foothills goes on to talk about the various
experts that were called at the trial of this case, and that the range of opinion of those
experts was from some $600,000.00 to zero.
Foothills fails to address Homeowners' argument that it should not have been
required to pay for the water right. Homeowners argued on page 13 in its brief filed in the
first round of this case, and reiterated in Addendum 5 of its initial brief in the instant
appeal, that the trial court had originally indicated Homeowners would be required to
reimburse Foothills for improvements by Foothills to the water system for the years 1974
to 1985 (R. 896). Nevertheless, at the valuation portion of the trial, the court expanded its
inquiry, without expressly overruling its original decision, and allowed and required the
parties to present evidence regarding the value of the water right in question, Application
No. 33130 (59-1608) also referred to as the "Glazier Well Water Right." This was true,
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despite the Court's having previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
dated October 20,1989 (R. 899-904; Homeowners first round brief Add. 4) in which it ruled
that Homeowners had previously obtained the right, title, and interest in the disputed water
right due to an Assignment from Hi-Country Estates, Inc. to Homeowners and an
acknowledgement by the State Engineer's Division of Water Rights that the Homeowners
were the owner of the water right referred to as the Glazier Well Water Right.
Foothills does not say one single word about this inconsistency in the trial court's
ruling in its brief in the instant matter, but simply ignores it altogether. It is the position
of Homeowners that if it was found to be the owner of the water right based upon historical
assignments and acknowledgements by appropriate entities and authority, it should not be
required to pay anything for the water right in question. Even if this Court were to
determine that the trial court was correct in finding that Homeowners would be unjustly
enriched by virtue of the improvements made in the water system itself by Foothills while
Foothills was unlawfully in control of Homeowners' water system, that same reasoning
cannot apply to the water right itself. Foothills did not present any evidence in the lower
court, and has not advanced any arguments before this Court as to how Homeowners have
been unjustly enriched as a result of Foothills' actions with regard to the water right itself.
At the very least then, this Court should remand the case to the trial court for a
determination of what portion of the $98,500.00 the Court intended to assign as unjust
enrichment with regard to the water right itself. We know that the Court assigned some
portion of the $98,500.00 as value for the water right because the Court entered a finding
of fact in its October 31, 1990, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows:

9. The Homeowners Association will be unjustly enriched
unless they reimburse Foothills Water Company as successor-ininterest to Bagley & Company for the fair amount of the entire
water system, the improvements made thereon from 1974 to
1985 and the water right.
R. 1623; Add. 5 p. 4, Homeowners' opening brief in the first round (emphasis supplied).
Furthermore, Homeowners pointed out that in its Conclusions of Law of the same
date, the trial court ruled:
2. The Homeowners Association must pay Foothills Water
Company the total sum of $98,500.00 for the value of the water
system and water right.
R. 1624; Add. 5 p. 5, Homeowners' opening brief in the first round (emphasis supplied).
As pointed out previously, in the Court's final "Order Regarding Amount Payable by
Plaintiff for the Subject Water System" issued October 31, 1990, the Court ruled:
The Plaintiff is entitled to an Order Quieting Title to the water
system within the boundaries of Hi-Country Estates Subdivision
Phase I, and the water right represented bv Application No.
33130 (59-1608) on file with Utah State Department of Natural
Resources, Division of Water Rights and the Utah State
Engineer's Office, upon payment of the sum of $98,500.00 to
Foothills Water Company . . .
R. 1627; Add. 6 p. 2, Homeowners opening brief in the first round (emphasis supplied).
It is unfair and unjust that Homeowners should be found to have owned the water
right and yet be required to pay Foothills in order to obtain a quiet title order to said water
right. Foothills has never advanced an argument as to how Homeowners have been unjustly
enriched with regard to this water right. Homeowners acknowledge that Foothills at least
made an effort in the lower court to show the amounts expended for improvements on the
water system itself, but no evidence was ever introduced in the lower court as to how
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Homeowners had been unjustly enriched with regard to this water right that they were found
to have owned since 1985. See Assignment of Application of Water Right 33130 (59-1608)
from Hi-Country Estates, Inc. to Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association, Add. 7
Homeowners opening brief in the first round.
Homeowners would also ask the Court to consider carefully the evidence that it
presented in the lower court with regard to the value of improvements to the water system
which the trial judge felt created an unjust enrichment type situation. This Court needs to
understand first and foremost that the trial judge found as a matter of fact and concluded
as a matter of law that Plaintiff was the legal owner of the disputed water system, which
includes the water rights, the water lots, the water tanks, and the water lines.

In its

Conclusions of Law dated October 20, 1989, the Court ruled: "Plaintiff is the legal owner
of the disputed water system, which includes the water right, the water lots, the water tanks,
and the water lines (R. 899-904; Add. 4, Homeowners opening brief in the first round).
Having so concluded, the trial judge's inquiry regarding what amount should be paid
by Homeowners to Foothills should have focused on improvements to the water system
made prior to the time that the Homeowners obtained title to the water system. Indeed,
this was the initial conclusion of law of the Court on this issue in that same document of
October 20, 1989, where the Court stated in Conclusion of Law No. 7:
Defendants Foothills Water Company and/or Bagley & Company, by virtue of several legal and equitable principals are
entitled to reasonable reimbursement for improvements made
by them to Plaintiffs' water system from 1974 to 1985.
R. 904; Add. 4, Homeowners opening brief in the first round.
10

Perhaps this Court can now see why it is so significant that when the trial judge
decided to determine the value of the water system without overruling this prior order at
the valuation portion of the trial held on July 30, 31 and August 1,1990, the lower court had
significantly expanded its inquiry to include a determination of the general value of the
water system. In doing so, the Court went beyond the concept of unjust enrichment based
upon improvements to the water system and now created a circumstance where it was
requiring Homeowners to pay once again for a water system and water right the Court had
determined it already owned. This is why it was clearly erroneous for the Court to have
based its decision on the amount to be paid by Homeowners for this water system on
anything other than the value of the improvements themselves.
Homeowners presented the testimony of Jon Strawn, former Chief Rate Engineer for
the Division of Public Utilities, who testified that Foothills' operation of the water system
(which actually belonged to Homeowners according to the trial judge's ruling) had shown
a substantial loss every year between 1985, when it first began operating the water system,
and the time of his testimony (1990). Furthermore, Mr. Strawn went on to state that as a
result of the significant losses in the water system, it had no value to anyone other than the
people who were served by the water system itself. These were the homeowners of HiCountry Estates Homeowners Association, Plaintiffs and Appellants in this matter (R. 2047,
2055, 2057). Mr. Strawn went on further to testify that his opinion of the value of
improvements between 1974 and the time of his testimony (1990) was $13,376.69 (R. 2052).
However, Mr. Strawn further testified that it would cost a new owner $160,300.00 to bring
this antiquated water system up to appropriate standards (R. 2053, 2055).
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Apparently, the trial judge totally disregarded the opinion of Mr. Strawn, who was
the only witness that specifically testified regarding improvements to the water system
between 1974 and 1990. Two expert witnesses called by Foothills in the trial, Stanley S.
Postma and Seth Schick, testified as to their opinion of the value of the water system and
water right as a whole. They gave no opinion as to the value of improvements with regard
to the water system between 1974 and 1985, or 1990.
Therefore, it is the position of Homeowners that the decision of the trial judge in
reaching the conclusion that Homeowners would be unjustly enriched to the tune of
$98,500.00 if they were to be awarded the water system was clearly erroneous. The trial
judge should have based his decision on the opinion of Mr. Jon Strawn, who had testified
that he had worked with the water system continuously as Chief Rate Engineer for the
Division of Public Utilities between 1985 and 1990. Mr. Strawn testified that he had
personally gone out and reviewed the water system on numerous occasions during that fiveyear period in his official capacity, and was intimately familiar with it (R. 1995-1999).
In its brief in the instant appeal, Foothills totally disregards Homeowners' argument
in its opening brief regarding the importance of the testimony of Jon Strawn.
Homeowners also argued in its opening brief in the instant matter, as well as in the
first round, that they had already paid for the water system and should not be required to
pay a second time. Foothills gives this argument short shrift by simply concluding that there
was no evidence cited by Homeowners to support or compel a conclusion that the
developers ever intended or agreed that Homeowners would be given title or control of the
water system. Yet in making this argument, Foothills would have had to completely

overlook Homeowners' argument in its initial brief in the instant matter, and also its
opening brief in the first round, that one of the original developers, Mr. Gerald H. Bagley,
testified at a deposition on April 12, 1988, that it was his understanding he would recover
his investment in the water system through the sale of the lots. He also testified that
method of recovering the cost of the water system was consistent with other projects he had
developed (R. 1650 pp. 29, 30).
Homeowners also presented in the lower court the testimony of John Thomas, a real
estate agent who had resided in Hi-Country Estates Subdivision Phase I for 19 years at the
time of trial, and was originally employed by the other two developers of the Subdivision
(along with Mr. Bagley), Mr. Spencer and Mr. Lewton, as project manager for the
development beginning in appropriately 1971 (R. 2087, 2088). Mr. Thomas testified further
that he had been authorized by Mr. Spencer and Mr. Lewton (who had bought out Mr.
Bagley at the time and were responsible for the development of the Subdivision) to inform
potential lot purchasers ".. . The property owners association was to own the water system,
at the time that the developers turned it back or over to them, and activated the property
owners association. . . " (R. 2090). Mr. Thomas further testified that the lots would have
been worthless to a prospective purchaser without the water system (R. 2091).
Homeowners also called other witnesses, including the former president of the
Homeowners Association, to testify that in their opinions they had paid for the water system
when they bought their lots, and that it had been represented to prospective purchasers that
the water system would be turned over to the Homeowners Association. The testimony of
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one of the other developers, Charles Lewton, was presented to the Court as part of a
deposition Mr. Lewton originally provided.

Mr. Lewton testified that the reason the

Homeowners Association was created by the developers in the first place was so they could
take over the "amenities" that would service all of the lot owners. He testified that the
water system was one of the amenities (R. 1655 p. 39).
Although original developer Gerald H. Bagley changed his testimony between the
deposition and the trial with regard to his intent as to the water system, he was substantially
impeached by the additional testimony presented by Homeowners, and by his prior
deposition stating otherwise (R. 2239, 2240).
Therefore, the conclusion must be reached by this Court that the trial judge's
determination of the amount of $98,500.00 to be paid by Homeowners for purposes of
unjust enrichment was clearly erroneous. This Court is asked to reverse the findings of the
trial court with instructions that the trial court enter an order finding that Homeowners
would not be unjustly enriched if it were not required to pay any monies to Foothills with
regard to this water system.
POINT III
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL JUDGE'S
DETERMINATION THAT THE 1977 WELL LEASE AGREEMENT IS A VALID AND BINDING PERPETUAL ENCUMBRANCE ON THE WATER SYSTEM.
In its initial brief in this matter, Homeowners argued that although the Utah
Supreme Court reversed this court's decision reversing the trial court in finding the 1977
Well Lease Agreement was a valid encumbrance on the water system, it did so only on the
14

basis that this Court relied on the March 17, 1986, decision of the Public Service
Commission as grounds for such invalidation. This Court should now proceed, Homeowners
argued, to determine whether or not the 1977 Well Lease Agreement should be invalidated
on other grounds argued originally by Homeowners in its first round briefs before this
Court, which resulted in this Court's September 22,1993, opinion. Homeowners argued that
this Court should invalidate the Well Lease Agreement not only on the equitable grounds
that it was grossly unreasonable and showered virtually limitless benefits on Jesse Dansie
and the members of his immediate family, but also because this agreement terminated on
its face on April 10, 1987, and was never legally renewed. Homeowners argued that no
extensions of the agreement were ever submitted as evidence to the Court, and therefore
it could not be used as a valid basis for an eternal encumbrance upon the water system as
essentially ruled by the trial judge in this case.
Incredibly, Foothills responds in its brief by making the following statement in a
footnote on page 15: "The Well Lease provides that the parties to the agreement could
renew the Well Lease on terms to be agreed to by the parties. In April of 1987, Foothills
and Dansie agreed to continue the Well Lease on a month-to-month basis, and continued
that arrangement until March of 1993." Of course, Foothills makes no citation to the record
for this proposition and Homeowners challenges its veracity entirely. Homeowners maintain
that not one single shred of documentary evidence or otherwise was presented to the trial
judge with regard to any extensions of this Well Lease Agreement! Homeowners challenge
Foothills at oral argument of this matter, if such is allowed, to cite a single page of the
record in which a document showing an extension of this Well Lease Agreement alleged to
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have occurred in April of 1987, and apparently continuing until March of 1993, was ever
presented to the trial court. Furthermore, since the trial of this case was concluded on July
30, 31, and August 1, 1990, at the very least, any statement by Foothills in its brief that
something has occurred since the date of trial is not part of the record and should be
stricken by this Court. This statement is entirely inappropriate and should subject Foothills'
and its attorneys to sanctions pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
Even if some testimony had been elicited at trial from J. Rodney Dansie indicating
the Well Lease Agreement had somehow been extended, such testimony should have been
totally disregarded by the trial judge, and should be disregarded by this Court. This is true
because the Well Lease Agreement itself specifically provides: "Bagley shall have the right
to renew this Well Lease on terms to be agreed to by Bagley and Dansie at the termination
of this Lease on April 10, 1987." Foothills places great importance on the fact that Jesse
H. Dansie, the original party who leased the well to Gerald H. Bagley and the developers
of Hi-Country Estates Subdivision Phase I, had filed a "Notice of Interest in Real Property"
regarding this Well Lease Agreement. More will be said about this Notice of Claim
argument later, but it should be important to this Court to know that if Foothills is going
to rely on the Notice of Claim argument for the fact that somehow this Well Lease
Agreement should "run with the land" and the owners of the water system should be
perpetually responsible to comply with this agreement, no statement or claim is made that
these alleged extensions were filed with the appropriate County Recorder's Office. Since
the 1977 Well Lease Agreement expired on its face by its own terms on April 10, 1987 (a

fact not disputed by Foothills in its responsive brief), then any extension, to be valid, should
have also been recorded with the County Recorder's Office. No evidence of such extension
was ever presented to the lower court, nor has any motion to supplement the record been
made in this Court to establish that such extensions had been recorded.
Foothills and its attorneys know well that no such written extensions even exist, let
alone have been recorded, and this is why they have not cited to the record regarding these
alleged extensions, nor attempted to present any evidence to the lower court or this Court
as to the recording of such alleged extensions.
In addition, it is the apparent allegation of Foothills that "Foothills and Dansie"
agreed to continue the Well Lease on a month-to-month basis. The Court should
understand that, like the original agreement, this agreement was intended to benefit the
Homeowners of Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association who were being served by the
water system Foothills Water Company was illegally operating. We say illegally because the
trial judge found that Homeowners had owned that water system since at least 1985.
Therefore, basic contract law suggests that Homeowners should have had an opportunity to
be a party to the alleged extension of this agreement, which they did not have. No evidence
was presented in the lower court whatsoever regarding this alleged extension of the
agreement and this is how the Court should know that Homeowners were not a party to the
agreement.
Finally, the Court should note that although Foothills was the successor-in-interest
of Bagley & Company, having taken over the water system from Bagley in approximately
1985, there was no evidence presented to the lower court with regard to who the successor-
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in-interest to Jesse H. Dansie was. Jesse H. Dansie became deceased on March 8,1987, (see
Addendum 1), over a month prior to the agreement's expiration on April 10, 1987; and so
when Foothills states in its brief that "Foothills and Dansie" had agreed to continue the Well
Lease in April of 1987, it is unclear as to which Dansie Foothills is referring to. If it was
J. Rodney Dansie, he was president of Foothills Water Company by his own testimony in
the lower court, and based upon several documents admitted in the case. See, e.g. R. 1052;
Add. 2 p. 9 Homeowners opening brief in the first round.
Therefore, it ought to be readily seen by this Court that Mr. Dansie, as owner and
president of Foothills Water Company is alleged to have made an agreement in April of
1987 with himself in what could not possibly have been an arms length transaction to
continue this Well Lease Agreement on a month-to-month basis as claimed by Foothills in
its brief on page 15. This claim by Foothills is absolutely outrageous! This Court should
demand appropriate proof that a legally valid extension was presented to the trial court
before it even considers upholding this perpetual encumbrance on the water system found
by the trial judge to be owned by Homeowners.
Foothills also makes the untenable argument that because Jesse H. Dansie filed a
"Notice of Interest in Real Property" with the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, the
terms of the Well Lease Agreement should be applied in perpetuity, for time and all
eternity, to anyone who purchases property in Hi-Country Estates Subdivision and uses the
water system there. This argument is ludicrous at best! Foothills seemis to be arguing that
the fact that this Notice of Interest was recorded should somehow have given appropriate
notice to all purchasers of lots in Hi-Country Estates Subdivision that the water system they

were counting on to provide them water was encumbered by a perpetual encumbrance.
Homeowners would present the clear fact that the purpose and effect of recording is to give
rise to certain presumptions pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 57-4a-4
(as amended 1989). However, it should be understood by the Court that the 1977 Well Lease
and Water Line Extension Agreement in question was not itself recorded. All that was recorded
was a "Notice of Interest in Real Property" which referred to the Well Lease Agreement.
Therefore, Utah's Recording Act provides no presumptions for the Well Lease Agreement
itself.
Furthermore, Foothills seems to be arguing that the fact of recordation of this
"Notice of Interest in Real Property" somehow amended the specific terms of the Lease
Agreement itself which provided as follows: "4. Bagley shall have the right to renew this
Well Lease on terms to be agreed to by Bagley and Dansie at the termination of this Lease
on April 10, 1987." If this Court can find no valid extension of this Well Lease Agreement
by appropriate parties under appropriate circumstances, the mere fact that the "Notice of
Interest in Real Property" was recorded in 1985 by Jesse H. Dansie is totally irrelevant to
the Court's inquiry. This recorded Notice of Interest does nothing more than a Notice of
Lis Pendens pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-40-2. The lis pendens simply gives
parties notice of a lawsuit regarding real property. In and of itself, it conveys no interest
and does not alter any terms of the lawsuit it gives notice of. Likewise, this "Notice of
Interest in Real Property" does not alter the terms of the underlying agreement; and thus
it cannot act as an extension of the contract provision which provides for expiration on April
10, 1987.

19

In its "Order on Briefing" dated February 8, 1996, this Court specifically ruled that
its original opinion holding that Appellant Hi-Countiy Estates Homeowners Association
holds legal title to the water right, lots, and system was unaffected by the opinion of the
Utah Supreme Court on certiorari and, accordingly, has been affirmed. This being the case,
the Court needs to view this 1977 Well Lease and Water Line Transportation Agreement
from the standpoint of the parties involved in that agreement. Even if it is presumed that
it was appropriate for Gerald H. Bagley to have entered into this agreement with Jesse H.
Dansie to provide a benefit to the Homeowners and lot owners who own property within
Hi-Country Estates Subdivision Phase I, Mr. Bagley transferred whatever interest he had in
that regard to J. Rodney Dansie and Foothills Water Company on October 31, 1985 (R.
1623; Add. 5, p. 4, Homeowners opening brief in the first round). Since Homeowners must
be presumed, as a result of the final decision of the trial court, affirmed by this Court on
appeal, that it owned the water system by virtue of an assignment from Hi-Country Estates,
Inc. to Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association dated June 28, 1985 (R. 1359, 1402),
only Homeowners would have the authority to be an appropriate party to extend the Well
Lease Agreement when it expired on April 10, 1987. Instead, what Foothills claims
happened was that Foothills itself entered into that extension, even though this Court has
now affirmed the ruling that Foothills was unlawfully in control of the water system at that
time. Therefore, as legitimate successor to the original developer, Gerald H. Bagley, only
the Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association Phase I representatives would have had
the authority to have extended that Well Lease Agreement. Since there is no evidence that
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it did so, this Court must conclude the Well Lease Agreement terminated on April 10,1987,
and no longer acts as an encumbrance on the water system.
Furthermore, Homeowners ask the Court to consider that, at the very least, this was
an unconscionable agreement since it purported to provide water in perpetuity, as long as
the water system in Hi-Country Estates Subdivision Phase I exists, to the Dansie family.
This is true despite the fact that Foothills itself concedes that the Homeowners no longer
use water from the well which was the subject of this 1977 Well Lease Agreement. This can
be determined from the statement of Foothills indicated previously on page 15 of their brief
that the month-to-month tenancy allegedly agreed to and extended by "Foothills and Dansie"
continued only until March of 1993. This was because of the fact that Homeowners drilled
their own well and began pumping their own water at that time. This fact, in and of itself,
makes the alleged contract extension unconscionable, not to mention the other reasons cited
in this brief. The Utah Supreme Court and this Court have held in numerous cases that
Utah courts will refuse to enforce any contract if it appears to be clearly unconscionable.
See In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413 (Utah 1978); Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455
(Utah 1983); Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37 (Utah App. 1988). Homeowners submit that this
contract, or at least its alleged extension providing water in perpetuity to the Dansie family,
is clearly unconscionable and simply should not be enforced by this Court.
Finally, Homeowners reassert the fact that the decision of the trial judge in this case
was inconsistent in that the trial judge found in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
dated October 31, 1990, in Finding of Fact No. 5 that the Well Lease and Water Line
Extension Agreement, which is the subject of this lawsuit, "was and is a valid and fully
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binding encumbrance on the subject water system." Despite tin's statement, the Court goes
on to state within this same Finding of Fact No. 5: "That encumbrance does not in any way
legally burden the water system or the owner or operator of the water system." Homeowners have continually argued that this Finding of Fact is internally inconsistent. How can the
Court find that an agreement is a valid and fully binding encumbrance on the water system
and yet in the same breath state that such encumbrance does not in any way legally burden
the water system or the owner or operator of the water system? Judge Brian has created
a non sequitur. It is simply not logical for the Court to have concluded that Homeowners
must obey the terms of an agreement they were not even a party to, and yet the
requirement to obey those terms is not a legal burden on the water system.
CONCLUSION
Homeowners respectfully request that the Utah Court of Appeals find and conclude
that they should not have been required to pay the sum of $98,500.00 for their water system
on grounds other than the determination of the Public Service Commission found to be
impermissible by the Utah Supreme Court. Furthermore, Homeowners respectfully request
that this Court completely invalidate the 1977 Well Lease and Water Line Extension
Agreement which the trial judge found to be a perpetual encumbrance on the water system
on equitable and legal grounds as indicated herein. Fundamental fairness requires a finding
by this Court that that agreement is invalid, and it is respectfully requested that this Court
enter such an Order.
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